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Abstract 
This paper tests whether individual perceptions of markets as good or bad for a public good is 
correlated with the propensity to report gaps in willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to 
accept (WTA) revealed within an incentive compatible mechanism. Identifying people based 
on a notion of market affinity, we find a substantial part of the gap can be explained by 
controlling for some variables that were not controlled for before. This result suggests 
the valuation gap for public goods can be reduced through well-defined variables.   
 
Introduction 
The purpose of cost benefit analysis (CBA) is to compare costs and benefits 
for a given public project. In many cases, several dimension of the considered project 
involve values that cannot be assessed using market values. To address this issue, 
contingent valuation surveys are commonly used to assess the value of non-market 
goods. Roughly speaking, contingent valuation surveys consist in asking respondents 
how much they are willing to pay, or are willing to accept, for the project. Many 
precautions are taken so respondents face a market-like situation. Researchers expect 
this market framing will help individuals providing meaningful values. Experimental 
evidence supports this view: repeated interaction with market-like situations leads to 
stated values more in line with the rational values assumed in standard CBA.1  
However, in contingent valuation a lot of protest behavior is commonly observed, 
e.g., a large fraction of the respondents refuses to pay at all. Most researchers have a 
specific treatment of “zero bidders”, e.g., dropping them out of the sample used to 
                                                
1 See for example Coursey et al. (1987), Shogren et al. (1994, 2001), Loomes et al. (2003), List 
(2004), and Plott and Zeiler (2005).  This result can go further—market rationality can transfer to 
statements of value for nonmarket goods, i.e., a rationality spillover exists between market and 
nonmarket goods linked through market experience (e.g., Cherry et al., 2003). 
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compute relevant values. In general, the literature has not addressed the challenge of 
those respondents who may have lowered their value to protest but are still willing to 
pay a positive amount. In this paper, we propose to have a more careful look at the 
origin of protest behavior. In particular, not everyone necessarily views the market as 
the ideal allocation device for public goods provision. A WTA-WTP gap could arise 
because people are signaling their discontentment with the market mechanism for a 
public good.  If so, such behavior should be identified and controlled so researchers to 
do not otherwise interpret values as inconsistent with rational choice theory, i.e., the 
endowment effect.2  An important result is that protest behavior does not only take 
the form of “zero bidding” but also of lowering WTP. This suggests protest behavior 
also affects positive bids.3  
 
Experimental design 
This paper considers the collective choice question of preventing Saturday 
classes at a French University.  The open question is whether the students use 
opportunities to report valuations to signal their dissatisfaction with the mechanism 
used to collect their valuations, even though we frame mechanism as being incentive 
compatible.  We control for a French student’s characteristics in two dimensions: his 
or her moral acceptance of the general principles of market trade and his or her 
idiosyncratic positive or negative attitude towards the specific project being valued. 
A market friendly person who finds the idea of market exchanges acceptable in 
                                                
2  An endowment effect could trigger a WTA-WTP gap if people are overly-attached to a good 
just because it is in their possession, leading to an excessively large WTA for the good (see Plott and 
Zeiler, 2005).   
3  Note we do not capture protest behavior in the form of a person disputing assigned or 
unassigned property rights. 
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general and who has a positive idiosyncratic attitude towards the specific project 
should state his or her value in a more market-like manner.  Here we should observe 
no fundamental endowment effect—a person does not assign a greater value to 
projects they have rights to relative to those they do not.   Therefore, the ratio of 
WTA and WTP should be closer to unity.4   
In contrast, a market wary person might protest the specific project either he or she 
questions the morality of market exchange or chooses to signal his discontent through 
a valuation statement, or both.  One might expect him to overstate his willingness to 
accept and understand his willingness to pay, such that a substantial gap in WTA-
WTP values emerges. We suggest the WTA-WTP gap does not only emerge from a 
fundamental endowment effect but also from respondents protesting the idea of a 
market solution to a public goods problem.   
Preliminaries—In the spring of 2005, the University of Marne-la-Vallée was short of 
classrooms due to increasing enrollment and competing outside demands for space. 
University officials found it difficult to find space for all class, and therefore added a 
few classes on Saturday morning in a haphazard, decentralized manner, triggering 
student protests across the campus.   
The President of the University decided to clarify the situation.  He proposed 
two options:  (1) Saturday classes would become the rule, the University gains 
benefits by renting out the buildings to outside interests during weekdays evening. 
Monetary compensations are thus proposed to students (i.e., lower fees) to attend 
additional Saturday classes. (2) If there would be no Saturday classes, then additional 
                                                
4  The WTP-WTA divergence can also be explained by the lack of substitutes (Hanemann, 
1991; Shogren et al., 1994). Here, we do not exclude this possibility. For our result to hold we only 
state that if the ratio equals unity for one group, then we can argue that market rationality is at work. 
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buildings for more weekday classes have to be rented by the University, which would 
most likely imply higher student fees to pay for the extra space. 
Stages—the experimental design had four stages.  First, before each student 
submitted a monetary value, she knew the unknown median value would be the 
threshold against which one would compare benefits to the unknown costs.5  The 
weakly dominant strategy is thus to bid the truth. 
We reinforced the importance of the incentive compatible exchange institution 
in three ways:  (1) the front cover of the experimental instructions had a letter written 
and officially signed by the University President.  (2) An explicit warning to buttress 
the idea that a real decision would be made by the University President (see 
Cummings and Taylor, 1999).  (3) An ex post exit interview with students to make 
sure they understood the mechanism and took the exercise seriously.    
 Second, the student participants were randomly allocated into two groups: 
those who would receive a willingness to accept (WTA) question within this 
incentive compatible framework, and those who would receive a willingness to pay 
(WTP) question.   In the WTA question, students were asked:  How much would you 
accept to attend two Saturday morning classes every month?  In the WTP question, 
students were asked:  How much would you pay for renting extra buildings, which would 
avoid Saturday morning classes?  A total of 362 students participated: 177 for WTA, 
185 for WTP. 
                                                
5  To create diffuse priors on the distribution of costs, the monitors told students that the costs 
to them were unknown at the present time for two reasons: (1) it was hard to assess the complete per 
capita costs of the project at the current time; and (2) the students only have to pay for a fraction of the 
total costs given unknown and unspecified government subsidies.   
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 In the third stage, we controlled for students protest behavior in two ways: a 
student’s moral acceptance of a market solution in general and a student’s 
idiosyncratic attitude toward the project in particular.  We first captured moral 
acceptance, by asking each student either (1) if he or she accepted the principle of 
renting classrooms to outsider groups to gain funds for the university (in the WTA 
version), or (2) if they accepted the principle that students must pay extra fees to the  
University to help pay for renting additional buildings for weekday classes? (WTP 
version).    
Next we elicited an individual characteristic that arises from focus group 
interviews ran prior to the survey. The following question was then constructed to 
capture what appears to polarized general attitude towards the organization of the 
university:  in your opinion, the main purpose of the University is to get skill or a 
diploma?  As the focus group made clear, this distinction is likely to capture the 
distinction between those who are willing to find a solution to prevent problems (they 
actively look for solutions) and those who do not adopt a constructive attitude toward 
a collective problem (they do not feel too concern and act as if they want others to 
find solutions).  A default of this study is that we did not anticipate that protest should 
be captured along two dimensions: the acceptance of the mechanism itself and the 
willingness to actively find a solution. Further work aiming at gathering information 
to control for the divergence in the evaluation of public goods should then control for 
both dimensions and not rely, as we do here for lack of a direct elicitation, on a proxy 
for the willingness to actively find a solution.  
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 The final stage asked students a battery of socio-economic and attitude 
questions about if they paid students fees or had a grant, if they worked on Saturday 
mornings, age, sex, and so on.    
 
Results  
Table 1 summarizes the mean and median WTA and WTP statements for all 
subjects, and we see that the ratio WTA/WTP is substantially larger than unity, 4.5. 
This magnitude of the ratio falls to within the range of the majority of studies.6  But 
this homogenous ratio is misleading once we control for heterogeneity in attitudes 
toward moral acceptances and idiosyncratic attitudes.  Interestingly, Table 1 reveals 
that the propensity to find the market unacceptable is about 52 percent greater in the 
WTP treatment relative to the WTA treatment (145 versus 90).7  This result suggests 
people protest more about the market when they are asked to pay out of their own 
pocket rather than receiving extra compensation.   
Second, a key result emerges—for market acceptable people, WTA/WTP = 
2.2 (= 64.27€/29.45€) and for market non-acceptable people, WTA/WTP = 6.5 
(=73.54€/11.33€). As expected the ratio is lower for subjects who found the market 
acceptable. The same result—a lower WTA-WTP gap for those who found the 
market acceptable—holds when we compare the median values. 
If one breaks down the results further into Skill and Diploma students, we see 
that for Market Acceptable/Skill students, WTA/WTP = 1 (= 56.23€/56.10€).    We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of value equality at any level of significance using 
                                                
6  See for instance the reviews by Sayman and Öncüler (2005) and Plott and Zeiler (2005). 
7  (145/188)/(90/177) =1.52.   
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equality of means t-test (t=0.006) and Mann-Whitney (z = 139.5). For Market Non-
acceptable/Diploma people, WTA/WTP = 7.5.   Here we reject the null (t=7.647; z = 
5407).  
We also ran a multinomial probit to test whether our proxies for market 
affinity (moral acceptance and idiosyncratic attitudes) could be proxies for the 
subject’s socio-economic characteristics that may have an impact (occupation on 
Saturday morning, grant holder as a good proxy of student’s income, level of study, 
etc). Table 2 shows we find no significance of any covariate.  Protesting is not driven 
by observables; rather the protest behavior herein appears to be an independent 
characteristic to be control.  
 
Conclusion 
Consider again how we value public goods. In absence of any control, 
assessing the value of the public good is not straightforward. Which value should be 
selected? One could probably argue that, as a result of the gap, any value between 
15€ and 69€ could be chosen for different reasons.  Our result provides guidelines: 
once protest behavior is controlled for, a smaller interval emerged [29€ ; 64€]. If we 
go further to control heterogeneity, a value of 56€ emerges.   
We find considerable heterogeneity about the importance of the WTA-WTP 
gap. The addition of straightforward controls, however, allows researchers to reduce 
this gap to obtain more accurate values for public goods. In particular, respondents 
who use the mechanism to protest by reducing their WTP are responsible for a large 
part of the observed gap. What was initially thought to be a sign of irrational behavior 
may well be largely driven by protest behavior. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics (in Euros, €) 
 
Breakdown by 
Market acceptance 
 
Breakdown by 
Moral Acceptance & 
Idiosyncratic Attitudes 
 
 
Market 
Acc. 
 
Market 
Non-Acc. 
 
Market 
Acceptable 
 
 
Market 
Non-Acceptable 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All 
Subjects    
Skill 
 
Diploma 
 
Skill 
 
Diploma 
 
WTA  
Mean  
Median 
S.D 
N 
 
 
68.98 
50 
56.81 
177 
 
 
64.27 
50 
54.60 
87 
 
 
73.54 
50 
58.82 
90 
 
 
56.23 
50 
46.37 
26 
 
 
67.70 
50 
57.76 
61 
 
 
69.85 
50 
50.36 
34 
 
 
75.79 
50 
63.74 
56 
 
WTP  
Mean 
Median S.D	  
N  
 
 
15.25 
10 22.76	  
185 
 
 
29.45 
20 38.98	  
40 
 
 
11.33 
10 13.37	  
145 
 
 
56.10 
27.5 61.02	  
10 
 
 
20.57 
15 23.70	  
30 
 
 
14.64 
6.25 18.31	  
38 
 
 
10.15 
10 10.97	  
107 
 
WTA/WTP 
(mean) 
 
 
4.5 
 
2.2 
 
6.5 
 
1.0 
 
3.3 
 
4.8 
 
7.5 
WTA=WTP 
t-test 
 
z  
  Mann-Withney 
 
11.71 
*** 
28072 
*** 
 
4.09 
*** 
2599 
*** 
 
9.87 
*** 
11607 
*** 
 
0.006 
 
139.5 
 
 
5.500 
*** 
1502 
*** 
 
6.044 
*** 
1099 
*** 
 
7.646 
*** 
5407 
*** 
 
 
 1
0 
  
 
Table 2. Multinomial probit estimates 
 Accept/Skill Accept/Dipl Nonaccp/Dipl 
 
Intercept 
 
 
-74.3312 
(0.80) 
 
 
-2.1140 
(0.99) 
 
427.1 
(0.22) 
Sex -0.0174 
(0.96) 
 
-0.3518 
(0.28) 
-0.8942 
(0.09) 
Age 0.0364 
(0.80) 
 
0.00192 
(0.99) 
-0.2156 
(0.22) 
Education level 0.7173 
(0.10) 
 
-0.3159 
(0.39) 
-0.3152 
(0.59) 
Grant holder 0.0750 
(0.87) 
 
-0.1240 
(0.74) 
0.0410 
(0.95) 
Job on Saturday 
morning (yes/no) 
0.0655 
(0.88) 
-0.4633 
(0.19) 
-0.1631 
(0.78) 
 
Saturday morning 
classes before  
 
-0.2067 
(0.72) 
 
0.2299  
(0.58) 
 
0.1265  
(0.85) 
 
Sense of achievement 
 
0.1422 
(0.59) 
 
 
-0.1537 
(0.46) 
 
0.0760 
(0.81) 
Mother's level of 
education 
-0.00110 
(0.99) 
 
0.2380 
(0.10) 
0.1893 
(0.39) 
Father's level of 
education 
0.1479 
(0.36) 
-0.2298 
(0.09) 
-0.00940 
(0.96) 
 
   p-values in parentheses 
 
 
